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THE ROLE OF WAGE DIFFERENCES AND INDIVIDUAL 
LABOUR SUPPLY ON MALE EARNINGS INEQUALITY: 






This paper studies the link between wage differences and individual earnings 
inequality for a sample of Spanish continuously working males from the European 
Community Household Panel for the period from 1994 to 1998. We analyse and quantify 
the contribution of two labour market features that could affect this link: the role of 
permanent and transitory wage inequality, and the existence of a significant response in 
individuals’ hours of work to shifts in their own wage rates. Based on Hyslop (2001), we 
propose a particular specification for wages and earnings that incorporates an 
intertemporal labour supply model and we obtain predictions on wage and earnings 
inequality using a covariance structure framework. 
Keywords: Wage inequality, individual earnings inequality, individual labour supply, 
covariance structure model. 
JEL: C23, J22. 
 
RESUMEN 
En este trabajo se analiza la relación entre las diferencias salariales y la desigualdad 
en rentas laborales individuales para una muestra de hombres empleados de forma 
continua en España en el período comprendido entre 1994 y 1998 procedente del Panel 
de Hogares de la Unión Europea (PHOGUE). En concreto, se analiza y cuantifica la 
contribución de dos aspectos del mercado laboral que pueden afectar a dicha relación o 
transmisión: el papel de la desigualdad salarial permanente o transitoria, y la existencia 
de respuestas significativas de las horas de trabajo de los individuos a variaciones en sus 
propios salarios. Basándonos en Hyslop (2001), se propone una especificación particular 
para los salarios y las rentas laborales que incorpora un modelo de oferta de trabajo 
intertemporal. A través de la estimación de dicho modelo, se obtienen predicciones de 
la desigualdad salarial y la desigualdad en rentas laborales utilizando un enfoque de 
estructura de covarianza. 
Palabras clave: Desigualdad salarial, desigualdad en rentas laborales, oferta de 
trabajo individual, modelo de estructura de covarianza. 1 Introduction
The issue of the changes of the wage structure and overall earnings inequality has been
extensively studied in Labour Economics. The normative interest in wage inequality con-
cerns its e⁄ect on the individual well-being distribution since widening wage structure
could imply widening earnings and consumption inequality, and associated welfare prob-
lems. In the literature, there is a very important and wide research on the changes in the
wage structure and earnings inequality for the United States, specially for the last two
decades (Abowd and Card (1989), Bound and Johnson (1992), Katz and Murphy (1992),
Hyslop (2001)). A great part of this literature analyses the evolution of wage di⁄erences
between and within di⁄erent groups of workers and measures the contributions of fac-
tors as trade, human capital and technology on these di⁄erences (Freeman (1984),Willis
(1986), Katz and Murphy (1992), Bound and Johnson (1992), Autor et al (1998)). The
reason for this common interest is basically twofold. First, the wage structure has changed
signi￿cantly in most developed countries in last decades. Even though wage inequality de-
creased substantially during the 70￿ s, a great expansion of wage di⁄erentials arised in the
80￿ s, specially in the United States and United Kingdom (see Freeman and Katz (1994),
(1995)). Second, an increasing number of appropriate and comparable micro datasets re-
cently have been available for performing these studies during the last decades. However,
as Hyslop (2001) notes there is a lack of research on the link between wage di⁄erences
and individual earnings inequality and the mechanisms underlying this link in spite of the
importance of this question from a policy point of view.1
For Spain, as Jimeno et al. (2001) point out, the evidence on the evolution of wage
and earnings inequality is rather scarce. Most of the studies has focused on the disper-
sion in wages across workers (Garc￿a-Perea (1991), Jimeno and Toharia (1994)), and the
1Speci￿cally, Hyslop (2001) analyse the link between the dispersion in rates of pay and family earnings
inequality.
2contributions of di⁄erent economic individual charateristics to the wage inequality (Bover
et al. (2000) and Jimeno et al. (2001)) using di⁄erent datasets. More recently, Cervini
and Ramos (2006) analyse the evolution of earnings inequality for the period from 1993
to 2000 for a sample of male full-time employees drawn from the European Community
Household Panel (ECHP). Speci￿cally, they use an error component model to decompose
the earnings covariance structure into its permanent and transitory components. They
show that cross-sectional earnings inequality for this sample has not changed substan-
tially over the period. In addition to this, they ￿nd that this small change is determined
by a rise in the permanent component of the variance and a decrease in the transitory
component. In particular, they claim that these results could be explained by the labour
market reforms implemented in Spain in 1994 and 1997, which introduced more stability
to temporary employment contracts and pushed towards a decrease in temporary employ-
ment. However, Cervini and Ramos (2006) do not analyse the connection between wage
and earnings inequality. Therefore, given the policy implications of wage and earnings
inequality in terms of consumption inequality and individuals￿welfare, the goal of this
paper is to document the evolution of these two elements for continuously working males
in Spain for the period from 1994 to 1998. In particular, we analyse the link between
individual wages dispersion and the inequality of the individual earnings and we perform
a quantitative decomposition of the elements that a⁄ect this transmission. Following Hys-
lop (2001), we propose a model for wages and earnings that is based on an intertemporal
individual labour supply model and we obtain predictions for wage and earnings inequal-
ity using a covariance structure framework. Speci￿cally, we focus on two labour market
features that could a⁄ect this link: ￿rst, the distinction between permanent and transi-
tory shocks and their relative contributions on wage inequality. Second, the existence of
signi￿cant responses in individuals￿hours of work to shifts in their own wage rates. This
behaviour could a⁄ect the transmission of wage di⁄erences to earnings inequality since
annual earnings are de￿ned as the product of wages and the individual￿ s hours of work
per year. In particular, if there is no labour supply responses to changes in hourly wages,
wage inequality is transmitted perfectly to individual earnings inequality. However, the
existence of a signi￿cant labour supply behaviour could alter this transmission through
income and substitution e⁄ects. An income e⁄ect in which each individual￿ s hours of
work respond negatively to a variation in his wage will moderate the increase in earnings
3inequality. However, a substitution e⁄ect in which each individual￿ s hours of work react
positively to changes in his wage will emphasize the increase in inequality. These two
aspects are studied for a sample of Spanish continuously working males from the ECHP
for the period from 1994 to 1998.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a brief description of the data
and the trends of wage and individual earnings cross-sectional inequality for our Spanish
sample. In section 3, we specify a statistical model for the wages and earnings processes
to obtain predictions for the relationship between wage and earnings inequality. Based
on this theoretical model we develop an econometric speci￿cation for wages and we ￿t
this model to the empirical covariance structure of wages. Next, we present a particular
intertemporal individual labour supply model that incorporates the empirical speci￿cation
for wages and re￿ ects the relationship between wage and individual earnings processes.
Section 4 presents the results for the estimation of the joint model of wages and earnings
and section 5 focuses on the predictions implied by these estimates in terms of earnings
inequality. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Data and Descriptive Analysis
2.1 Data
The data used in this analysis is drawn from the Spanish version of the ECHP. This data
set provides comparable statistical annual information about the labour status and welfare
level of households in the EU-15 countries allowing their social and economic situation
to be analysed. For Spain, this is the unique panel that provides detailed information at
household and individual level on earnings, income, hours of work, and demographics of
people aged 16 and older. Furthermore, it also contains information about the individual￿ s
job like economic activity, ￿rm size, public/private sector, and region. However, there
are not details about institutional factors (unions, government wage regulation, internal
labour markets) that may in￿ uence how wages are determined.2
2In Spain there exists evidence about the signi￿cant positive e⁄ect of the dimension of unions on wage
di⁄erences for data from the Encuesta de Estructura Salarial 1995/2002 (Jimeno et al. (2001), Card and
De la Rica (2006)).
4In particular, we consider we consider males living in Spain for the period from 1994
to 1999. However, since annual income variables refer to the period prior to the interview
and the remaining data refer to the current period, the last year is lost for the estimation.
We select males aged between 25 and 65 and continuously working as employees at each
year. In order to maximise our sample size, we construct an unbalanced panel for the
period 1994-1998 including every individual-year observation with information about all
the variables that we consider in the analysis for a given year. As a result, we end up
with a sample of 2814 men with a total of 7548 individual-year observations.
We de￿ne individual earnings as the individual￿ s annual net labour income,3 that has
been de￿ acted by the annual mean of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) base 1992 and
is expressed in euros. Individual￿ s hourly wage rate is computed as the ratio of annual
earnings and the number of hours of work per year.4
2.2 Wage and Earnings Inequality Trends
In this section, we provide a descriptive analysis of the distribution of wages and earnings
in our sample of males for the period from 1994 to 1998. In addition to this, we analyse
the evolution of the cross-sectional wage and individual earnings inequality over these
years.
Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics of the distribution of the log of wages and
the log of earnings across individuals for each year. According to this information, the
mean of both variables decreases for the ￿rst three years and then, it increases in 1997
and 1998. With respect to the evolution of the standard deviation, we can see that the
dispersion in the distribution of both variables has not remained constant. In particular,
it has decreased for the overall period even though it presents a small increase for earnings
3In our sample, labour income for workers represents on average 95 percent of total income. Therefore,
the analysis of earnings inequality should be taken as an accurate indicator of income inequality in the
working population.
4In order to check the quality and the validity of our data, we compared the distribution of weekly hours
of work using two comparable samples from the ECHP and the Labour Force Survey (EPA), respectively,
for the year 1999. We obtained that these distributions were quite similar. In addition, we did a similar
comparison for the distribution of the hourly wage rate from the ECHP and the corresponding measure
from the Encuesta de Estructura Salarial for the year 1995. We obtained very similar results for both
surveys.
5in 1995 and a larger increase for the year 1996 for both variables.
Since the sample means of both wages and earnings do not change substantially along
these years, we will consider the cross-sectional variance as a measure of cross-sectional
inequality.5 Table 2 presents the trends for the cross-sectional inequality and its percent-
age changes during the period for both variables. We can observe that cross-sectional
inequality is higher for wages than for earnings along the period since the variance for
the log of wage is larger and the mean is smaller in every year. In addition, there has
been a decrease in both wage and earnings cross-sectional inequality for the overall pe-
riod although this reduction is more important for earnings. In fact, wage inequality has
decreased almost 3 percent whereas earnings inequality has reduced almost 5 percent.
However, if we consider each year variation, we can see that both variances present some
year to year ￿ uctuations. In particular, we can see that cross-sectional wage inequality
decreases in all periods with the exception of 1996, in which it experiences an increase
of 8 percent. Regarding earnings inequality, it increases in 1995 and 1996, and then it
decreases during the rest of the period compensating the increase at the initial years.
To understand and identify the forces that are driven this kind of patterns, it seems
crucial to raise three important questions. First, to determine to what extent changes in
wage and earnings inequality are due to changes in the observable individuals￿character-
istics (between-group inequality) rather than unobservable characteristics (within-group
or residual inequality). Second, to quantify the contributions of permanent and transitory
components on wage and earnings inequality. This decomposition is of interest because
it allows to determine the persistency of inequality changes and its potential e⁄ects on
individuals￿welfare since, in general, persistent di⁄erences a⁄ect more the distribution of
well-being than transitory di⁄erences. Finally, to analyse the relative importance of the
potential individual￿ s labour supply behaviour on the evolution of earnings inequality. To
quantify the role of all of these elements, we perform a standard variance decomposition
for wages and earnings using the model speci￿ed in next sections.
5As it is pointed by Hyslop (2001), Juhn et al. (1993) and Gottschalk and Mo¢ t (1994) the variance
of the log of earnings has perhaps been the most commonly used measured of dispersion in the recent
literature.
6Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Log Wage(1) and Log Earnings(2)
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Mean 1.502 1.501 1.486 1.572 1.577
Std. Dev 0.497 0.493 0.513 0.493 0.489
Median 1.487 1.456 1.439 1.538 1.537
Log Wages Min -1.322 -3.128 -1.868 -1.903 -0.849
25th Quantile 1.212 1.209 1.182 1.238 1.258
75th Quantile 1.786 1.793 1.787 1.920 1.881
Max 3.051 3.738 3.833 3.370 3.351
Mean 9.236 9.224 9.206 9.272 9.279
Std. Dev 0.473 0.476 0.494 0.462 0.461
Median 9.183 9.166 9.148 9.198 9.225
Log Earnings Min 6.436 4.917 6.035 6.223 7.197
25th Quantile 8.948 8.928 8.897 8.955 8.973
75th Quantile 9.487 9.481 9.456 9.575 9.564
Max 10.914 11.938 11.878 11.233 11.194
Sample Size 1456 1413 1338 1676 1665
Note: (1) Log of hourly wage.(2) Log of annual earnings. Wages and earnings have been
de￿ acted by the annual mean of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) base 1992 and are expressed
in euros.Number of observations, 1456 for 1994, 1413 for 1995, 1338 for 1996, 1676 for 1997 and
1665 for 1998.




Percentage change (1994-1995) (-1.4071) (1.5050)
1996 0.2635 0.2445
Percentage change (1995-1996) (8.3392) (7.7058)
1997 0.2433 0.2137
Percentage change (1996-1997) (-7.6522) (-12.6017)
1998 0.2398 0.2128
Percentage change (1997-1998) (-1.4698) (-0.4193)
Percentage change (1994-1998) (-2.8088) (-4.8509)
Note: (1) Log of hourly wage. (2) Log of annual earnings. Wages and earnings have been
de￿ acted by the annual mean of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) base 1992 and are expressed
in euros. Number of observations, 1456 for 1994, 1413 for 1995, 1338 for 1996, 1676 for 1997
and 1665 for 1998.
263 An Empirical Model for Wages and Earnings
3.1 The Theoretical Speci￿cation
In this section, we propose a speci￿c statistical model of covariance structure to perform
a factor decomposition of wage and individual earnings inequality. In addition to this, we
evaluate the elements that a⁄ect the link between wage di⁄erences and earnings inequal-
ity. Speci￿cally, this model allows us to analyse the contribution of three di⁄erent aspects:
￿rst, to what extent both cross-sectional variances are explained by some observable indi-
viduals￿characteristics, and how much remained unexplained; second, the decomposition
of both variables into permanent and transitory components; third, the role of individuals￿
labour supply decisions on the link between wage and earnings inequality.
We start with the following simple wage model:
lnwit = ￿t +  
0
tZit + ￿t￿i + uit (1)
where the subscripts i denotes the individual, t denotes the year, and lnwit is the
log of real hourly wage of individual i in period t: The wage is decomposed into several
terms: ￿t represents the mean wage in period t and re￿ ects common aggregate e⁄ects
for all individuals, Zit is a vector of observable individuals￿ characteristics, ￿i is the
unobserved permanent wage component that measures persistent worker skills such as
ability and uit represents the unobserved transitory wage component that captures the
e⁄ects of labour market shocks. Both unobserved components, ￿i and uit, are assumed
to be orthogonal with E (￿i) = E (uit) = 0; and with variances ￿2
￿ and ￿2
u; respectively.
The coe¢ cients ￿t are time-varying factor loadings on the permanent wage component
and can be interpreted as the time -varying skill price (returns to skill). By introducing
di⁄erent factor loadings for permanent wage components, we allow for nonstationarity in
these components and di⁄erent changes in permanent inequality.
From this theoretical model of wages, we can derive a theoretical speci￿cation for
individual earnings since annual earnings are computed as the product of the hourly wage
and the annual hours of work. Using this de￿nition, we have that lnyit = lnwit + lnhit
where lnyit and lnhit represent the log of annual earnings and the log of annual hours
or work of individual i in period t; respectively. This implies that the magnitude and
7the evolution of earnings di⁄erences are not only determined by the wage but also by the
individual￿ s labour supply decisions. As a result, we can distinguish between two cases.
First, the individual￿ s labour supply is completely inelastic and therefore given by the
following expression
lnyit = (￿t +  
0
tZit + ￿t￿i + uit) + Ki (2)
where Ki is the ￿xed number of hours of work of individual i per year, and it does not
depend on his own wage. In this case, the features of earnings dynamics will be given by
the following expression
V ar(lnyit) = V ar(lnwit) + V ar(lnKi) (3)
On the contrary, it could be that individuals show a signi￿cant labour supply behaviour
because of the existence of signi￿cant responses in individuals￿hours of work to shifts in
their own wage rates. In this case, the cross-sectional variance of earnings inequality has
the following form
V ar(lnyit) = V ar(lnwit) + V ar(lnhit) + 2Cov(lnwit;lnhit) (4)
Therefore, the responses of hours of work to wage changes (measured by the covariance
in equation (4)) can increase or mitigate the e⁄ect of the dispersion in wages on the cross-
sectional variance of earnings compared to the predictions obtained under the inelastic
labour supply assumption. In this second case, we will have to consider an intertemporal
individual labour supply model in order to capture the role of these responses of hours of
work on the relationship between wage and earnings cross-sectional inequality.
As a ￿rst approximation to this question, we can compare predictions given by (3) and
(4) with the information provided by Table 3 to determine which one better ￿ts our data.
In particular, we can observe that the cross-sectional variance of the log of earnings is
smaller than the sum of the cross-sectional variance of the log of wages and the log of hours
of work. Furthermore, the cross-sectional variance of the log of earnings is smaller than
the cross-sectional of the log of wages. This suggests that there exists a negative cross-
sectional covariance between the log of wages and the log of hours of work. To improve
our understanding about this issue and identify the potential existence of a signi￿cant
behaviour of the individual￿ s hours of work, we need to incorporate a structural model of
labour supply to our speci￿cation. However, ￿rst of all, we focus on the estimation of the
8wage equation and the decomposition of the wage cross-sectional inequality in permanent
and transitory components.
3.2 Wage Model Estimation
Given the theoretical wage model speci￿ed in (1), we now specify the econometric model
that we will ￿t to the empirical covariance structure of wages. In particular, we account
for serial correlation in transitory wages and for measurement errors in observed wages.
The empirical speci￿cation is given by the following expression,
lnw
￿
it = lnwit + ￿it = ￿t +  
0
tZit + ￿t￿i + uit + ￿it (5)
where
uit = ￿uit￿1 + vit;
lnw￿
it represents the log of the observed wage, lnwit is the log of the theoretical wage
given by equation (1), and ￿it captures the existence of measurement errors in wages and
it is assumed to be white noise. The unobserved transitory component uit follows a ￿rst-
order autoregresive process where the error term vit displays a zero mean and time-varying
variance ￿2
vt. This time-variation implies that transitory shocks may have di⁄erent e⁄ects
on wage inequality over time. For identi￿cation purposes the following assumptions are
considered,
E(￿i) = E(uit) = E(￿it) = E(￿iuit) = E(￿i￿it) = E(uit￿it) = 0; (6)
with the permanent scaled-factor for the ￿rst period ￿94 normalized to one.
This speci￿cation allows us to quantify the contributions of observable and unobserv-
able components of wages to changes in the overall cross-section wage inequality through
a standard variance decomposition. In particular, we obtain the (OLS) predictions of the
log of wages for each year from (5) using as regressors a set of observables characteris-
tics, Z.6 Then, we compute the variance of these predictions, and we get the following
6We include as regressors in the wage equation two dummies for the education level (secondary and
graduate studies, respectively), the age and age squared, a dummy for the marital status, the speci￿c
experience and the speci￿c experience squared, a set of dummies for the size and the economic activity




it) = V ar(b  
0
tZit) + V ar(￿
￿
it) (7)
where b  t
0
is the vector of estimated (OLS) returns to observable characteristics and ￿
￿
it
is the log wage OLS residual (which includes the e⁄ects of the unobservables). Notice
that this decomposition of the overall cross-section wage inequality into between-group
inequality (due to observables) and residual inequality (due to unobservables) relies on
the orthogonality of the predicted values (b  t
0
Zit) and the residuals (￿
￿
it) in an OLS regres-
sion. Table 4 reports the results of this decomposition. As we can see, even though the
between-inequality increases, the overall inequality decreases for the whole period due to
the decrease in the within-inequality. Besides, both components represent on average 50
percent of the overall inequality during the whole period 1994-1998. This implies that our
observable individual￿ s characteristics explain about one half of the wage inequality each
year and the returns of the unobserved skills, transitory shocks, measurement errors and
estimation error count for the other one half. From now on we will focus on the analysis
of the decomposition of wage residual inequality since this is the part of the inequality
that can not be explained by the observables. Therefore, we consider the following wage
equation
￿it = ￿t + ￿t￿i + uit + ￿it (8)
where ￿it is the unobserved component of the log of wage, that is estimated by the log wage
OLS residual, and uit follows a ￿rst order autoregresive process, uit = ￿uit￿1 + vit, where
vit displays a time-varying variance ￿2
vt. The parameters of interest to be estimated are ￿t,
the variance of the permanent component of wage (￿2
￿), the time-varying variance of the
transitory shock (￿2
￿t), the variance of the measurement error (￿2
￿) and the autoregresive
coe¢ cient in the transitory component (￿).
After removing the e⁄ect of the aggregate terms, we obtain the following set of theo-







￿ k = 0
￿t￿t+k￿2
￿ + ￿k￿2
ut jkj > 0




vt: Notice that for t = 1; ￿2
v1 can not be identi￿ed. Instead of
this parameter, we will estimate ￿2
u1 that is equal to ￿￿2
u0 + ￿2
v1:
10Table 3. Cross-Sectional Variances, 1994-1998.
Wage(1) Earnings(2) Hours(3)
1994 0.2466 0.2236 0.03399
1995 0.2432 0.2270 0.0347
Percentage change (1994-1995) (-1.4071) (1.5050) (1.9865)
1996 0.2635 0.2445 0.0328
Percentage change (1995-1996) (8.3392) (7.7058) (-5.2842)
1997 0.2433 0.2137 0.0379
Percentage change (1996-1997) (-7.6522) (-12.6017) (15.4338)
1998 0.2398 0.2128 0.03398
Percentage change (1997-1998) (-1.4698) (-0.4193) (-10.3546)
Percentage change (1994-1998) (-2.8088) (-4.8509) (-0.040)
Note: (1) Log of hourly wage.(2) Log of annual earnings. Wages and earnings have been
de￿ acted by the annual mean of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) base 1992 and are expressed
in euros.Number of observations, 1456 for 1994, 1413 for 1995, 1338 for 1996, 1676 for 1997 and
1665 for 1998.
Table 4. Wage Inequality Decomposition (1994-1998).(1)
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Overall Inequality 0.247 0.243 0.263 0.243 0.240
Between-Group Inequality 0.119 0.115 0.131 0.131 0.124
Percentage Explained (%) 48.202 47.496 49.800 53.763 51.665
Residual Inequality 0.128 0.128 0.132 0.112 0.116
Percentage Residual (%) 51.797 52.504 50.200 46.237 48.334
Sample Size 1456 1413 1338 1676 1665
Note:(1) Inequality is measured by the sample variance of the log hourly wage for each
year. Results are based on OLS regressions of the log of wage on two dummies for the education
level (secondary and graduate studies, respectively), the age and age squared, a dummy for the
marital status, the speci￿c experience and the speci￿c experience squared, a set of dummies for
the size and the economic activity of the ￿rm, and the region.
27This model is estimated using Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) techniques.
As it is commonly known in the literature (Chamberlin (1984), Newey (1985), Abowd
and Card (1989), Altonji and Segal (1996)), GMM estimators display generally desirable
asymptotic properties. In addition to this, assumptions such that innovations are normally
distributed are not necessary. Given our interest in the covariance structure of wages, we
follow Abowd and Card (1989) and Dickens (2000) and minimize the weighted distance
between the variance-covariance sample moments and the theoretical moments implied by
the model in (8) and (6). Since we end up with 15 moment conditions and 12 parameters,
the model is overidenti￿ed. In this case, di⁄erent GMM estimators are obtained for
di⁄erent weighting matrices. In particular, we estimate by Equally Weighted Minimum
Distance (EWMD) because it displays good properties in small samples applications (see
Altonji and Segal (1996) for a further discussion).7
Table 5 summarizes the estimation results. First of all, we should point out that the
value for the GMM goodness-of-￿t statistic (6.625 with 3 degrees of freedom) indicates
that this econometric speci￿cation represents a reasonable statistical description of our
wage data. Furthermore, most the parameters are highly signi￿cant. The autocorrelation
coe¢ cient for the transitory wage shock presents a value by far less than one (0.554),
which indicates that transitory shocks to wages do not show very high persistence and
that their e⁄ect will decline rapidly over time. The permanent factor-loading ￿t shows
little variation along years. Speci￿cally, it slightly increases for 1995 and then decreases
over the rest of the period. Based on these estimates, Table 6 reports the predictions for
the variance of wage residuals and the relative contributions of permanent components
and transitory components, and measurement errors to this variance. First of all, we
compare the sample variance and the predicted variance that appear in the ￿rst two rows
of Table 6. In particular, we can observe that our model underestimates slightly the
cross-sectional variance from 1995 to 1998 and overestimates the decrease in the variance
for the overall sample period (-9.3 for the actual variance and -15.32 for the predicted
variance). Regarding the factor decomposition, we can see that transitory and permanent
factors represent on average very similar contributions to the predicted variance (32.37
7In particular, Altonji and Segal (1996) show that eventhough Optimal Minimum Distance (OMD)
estimator displays better asymptotic properties, it presents a downward bias in ￿nite samples. Therefore,
it is dominated by EWMD in small sample applications.
11Table 5. Wage Model Estimates.


















u1 0.047￿￿ ￿ 0.554￿￿
(0.012) (0.308)
Goodness-of-￿t 6.625 p-value 0.085
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Degrees of freedom for goodness-of-￿t statistics,
3. Number of observations, 2814 men with a total of 7548 individual-year observations. (*)
Signi￿cant at 10%, (**) signi￿cant at 5%, (***) signi￿cant at 1%.
Table 6. Wage Inequality Predictions.
EWMD Estimation.
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Average 94-98 change (%)
Sample Variance 0.1277 0.1276 0.1322 0.1124 0.1158 0.1231 -9.2989
Predicted Variance 0.1279 0.1187 0.1225 0.1080 0.1083 0.1171 -15.3197
Predicted Permanent Variance 0.0382 0.0453 0.0383 0.0341 0.0336 0.0379 -12.0410
Explained by Permanent Factors (%)(1) 29.8350 38.1834 31.2852 31.5443 30.9902 32.3676 3.8719
Predicted Transitory Variance 0.0467 0.0303 0.0412 0.0309 0.0317 0.0362 -32.0968
Explained by Transitory Factors (%)(1) 36.5373 25.5604 33.6022 28.6144 29.2984 30.7226 -19.8122
Predicted M. Errors Variance 0.0430 0.0430 0.0430 0.0430 0.0430 0.0430 0
Explained by Measurement Error (%)(1) 33.6277 36.2562 35.1126 39.8413 39.7113 36.9098 18.0913
Note: (1) Predicted relative weight of each component on the predicted residual wage in-
equality.
28and 30.72 percent, respectively). However, their year-to-year ￿ uctuations present di⁄erent
patterns. Whereas permanent components have slightly increased their relative relevance
for the overall period, transitory factors have become substantially less important in
explaining residual inequality. In particular, the relative weight of permanent component
have increased about 4 percent, and the relative weight of transitory components have
decreased about 20 percent. As a result, whereas in 1994 the relative contribution to the
predicted variance is substantially larger for transitory factors, at the end of the sample
period permanent factors are slightly more important. In addition to this, we should
remark that the reduction in the predicted residual inequality is mostly explained by the
substantial decrease in the transitory variance in the overall period. As Cervini and Ramos
(2006) state, this reduction in earnings inequality due to transitory factors could be related
to the labour market reforms implemented in 1994 and 1997 in Spain that pushed towards
a decrease in temporary employment. With respect to the importance of measurement
errors in wages, we have assumed that the variance of the term ￿it is constant overtime.
Our results show that this variance is very large and that a substantial part of the predicted
residual variance is attributable to measurement error (about 37 percent on average).
Furthermore, the relative importance of this component has increased considerably during
the overall period.
3.3 A Life-Cycle Model of Individual Labour Supply
As we discussed at the end of Section 3, the decomposition of the variance of the log of
earnings does not ￿t equation (3). In particular, we observed that the cross-sectional vari-
ance of the log of earnings is smaller than the sum of the cross-sectional variance of the log
of wages and the log of hours of work suggesting the existence of a negative cross-sectional
covariance between the log of wages and the log of hours of work. This suggests that in-
dividuals￿responses to wage changes could play some "role" in the evolution of individual
earnings inequality. In order to capture and quantify this "role", we use a theoretical
intertemporal individual labour supply model following Hyslop (2001).8 In particular, we
specify an intertemporal model ￿ la MaCurdy (1981). This structural model is based in
8Speci￿cally, Hyslop (2001) proposes a structural intertemporal family labour supply model to analyse
the relationship between household labour supply behaviour and family earnings inequality.
12the following maintained assumptions. First, we assume that individual￿ s time-preferences
are represented by an utility function separable in labour supply and consumption. More-
over, preferences are intertemporal additively separable. Second, wages are assumed to
be exogenous with respect individual￿ s decisions and follow the process given by equation
(1). Finally, we consider a deterministic framework (non-uncertainty) in the sense that
individuals have perfect foresight about wages, nonlabour income and prices. As a result,























where the subscripts i denotes the individual, t denotes the period, and hit and cit rep-
resent the number of hours of work and consumption for individual i in period t; respec-
tively. Regarding preferences components, we capture individual heterogeneity through
￿1it and ￿2it; that are age-speci￿c modi￿ers of "tastes". Such variables depend on all
of consumer i￿ s characteristics which plausible a⁄ect his preferences at period t. These
characteristics may include variables as the individual￿ s education level, children and age.
Besides, H represents the maximum number of hours of work, ￿1 and ￿2 are time-invariant
parameters common across workers, with 0 < ￿1 < 1 and ￿2 > 1; and ￿ is the discount
factor or the time preference rate. The budget constraint de￿nes incomes and expendi-
tures at each period where wit represents the individual￿ s hourly true real wage in period t;
that is assumed to follow the process speci￿ed by (1), and yN
it , pt and r are the nonlabour
income, the price of goods, and the real interest rate, respectively.
Solving the ￿rst order conditions for individual￿ s hours of work and assuming interior
solutions,9 we get the so-called ￿￿constant intertemporal labour supply for individual i
in period t; that takes the following form
lnhit = lnH + ￿ [ln￿i + lnwit ￿ tln  ￿ lnY2it ￿ ln￿2] (10)
where ￿i is the marginal utility of wealth for individual i (the Lagrange multiplier
associated to the budget contraint),   = 1+￿
1+r and ￿ = 1
￿2￿1: Notice that the wage term
9This assumption seems natural in this context since we are analysing the labour supply behaviour of
working males.
13that appears in (10) is the true wage and is given by (1). Therefore, the parameter ￿
is the intertemporal substitution elasticity and it is necessarily positive since it measures
the response of hours of work to evolutionary changes in wages over the life cycle, holding
constant the marginal utility of wealth, ￿: In particular, it re￿ ects how individuals allocate
their working time toward those years where their wages are higher in their lifetime. We
assume that r = ￿; so that,   = 1; and that "tastes" for work are randomly distributed
over the population according to the equation ln￿2it = %0
tXit + ￿i ￿ u￿
it, where Xit is a
vector of observable individual characteristics that a⁄ect hours of work, ￿i is a permanent
component and u￿
it is a time-varying error term with zero mean.10 Then, we get,
lnhit = lnH + ￿%
0
tXit + ￿ [ln￿i ￿ ￿i ￿ ln￿2] + ￿ lnwit + ￿u
￿
it (11)
Since individual￿ s annual earnings are computed as the product of annual hours of
work and the hourly wage, we obtain the following structural equation for individual￿ s
earnings:
lnyit = lnwit + lnhit = lnH + ￿%
0
tXit + ￿Fi + (￿ + 1)lnwit + ￿u
￿
it (12)
where Fi = (ln￿i ￿ ￿i ￿ ln￿2) and represents a time invariant component unique to
individual i that contains all the unobserved permanent components that a⁄ect labour
supply decisions. Given (11) and (12), we should point out the most salient features of this
model. First of all, given that the parameter ￿ measures the individual￿ s intertemporal
labour supply elasticity, there will exist a signi￿cant labour supply behaviour for individual
i as long as this parameter is nonzero. If this is the case, individual￿ s labour supply
behaviour will be determined by his own wage life-time stream in two ways: ￿rst, the
number of hours of work will depend for each period on its own contemporaneous wage
(substitution e⁄ect); second, it will also depend on Fi; that summarizes through ln￿i
all of the retrospective and prospective information about real wages and non-labour
income relevant to the individual i￿ s choices. However, if ￿ is zero, then each individual
will work a ￿xed number of hours, given by lnH; and the earnings equation will ￿t
the "no labour supply" earnings process given in equation (2). Secondly, we consider a
deterministic framework, that implies that individuals have perfect foresight with respect
10This decomposition is proposed by MaCurdy (1981).
14to their vectors of lifetime wages, prices and nonlabour income. Therefore, the model does
not re￿ ect individual responses to unanticipated wage variations. On the contrary, agents
fully anticipate all wage changes over the period, and therefore, any labour supply response
represents a purely intertemporal substitution e⁄ect along the ￿￿constant intertemporal
labour supply function.
4 Wages and Earnings Model Estimation
From equation (1) and (12), we derive the following empirical speci￿cation for the joint
model of wages and earnings:
lnw
￿
it = lnwit + ￿it = ￿t +  
0
tZit + ￿t￿i + uit + ￿it (13a)
lny
￿
it = lnyit + "it = lnH + ’
0
tYit + ￿Fi + (￿ + 1)(￿t + ￿t￿i + uit) + ￿u
￿
it + "it (13b)
where Yit is a vector of individual observable characteristics that a⁄ect earnings and
includes Zit and Xit. The term "it captures measurement errors in individual earnings
and is assumed to be white noise. For identi￿cation purposes, we assume in addition to
(6) that








it) = 0; (14)
with the permanent scaled-factor for the ￿rst period ￿94 normalized to one. Therefore, we
only allow for correlation between the permanent components in wages and hours of work
(￿i and Fi, respectively) and between the measurement errors in wages and earnings.11
Notice that ￿u￿
it (the transitory component of the "tastes" of work) and "it can not be
separately identi￿ed. Therefore, we will assume a particular stochastic process for the
whole component ￿u￿
it + "it; that will capture the transitory determinants of hours of
work and measurement errors.
11Remember that hourly wages have been computed as the ratio between annual earnings and annual
hours of work. Therefore, ￿it and "it could be correlated between each other.
15Using equation (13b), we can quantify the contributions of observable and unobserv-
able components of earnings to changes in the overall cross-section inequality through the
same variance decomposition that we performed for wages. In particular, if we obtain
the (OLS) predictions of the log of earnings for each year using as regressors the set of




it) = V ar(b ’
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is the vector of estimated (OLS) returns to observable characteristics and &￿
it
is the log earnings OLS residuals for each individual i in each period t (which includes
all the e⁄ects of the unobservables). Table 7 reports the results of this decomposition.
Given these results, we can observe that both components of the overall inequality in log
earnings have decreased in the period although such pattern do not hold for all years.
Besides, the decrease in residual inequality is larger than in between-group inequality.
Regarding the relative importance of each component, we should notice that observable
variables count on average for sligthly more than 50 percent, and they have increased
their contribution in the period from 50 percent to 52 percent. However, similar to the
case of wage inequality, both components play rather the same role in explaining the
overall earnings inequality. As we pointed out below, we now focus on the analysis of the
decomposition of earnings residual inequality since this is the part of the inequality that
can not be explained by our observables.
Therefore, we consider the following system for the unobserved components of both
the log of wage and the log of earnings,
￿it = ￿t + ￿t￿i + uit + ￿it = lnw
+
it + ￿it (16a)
&it = lnH + ￿Fi + (￿ + 1)lnw
+
it + ￿it (16b)
where ￿it and &it are the unobserved component of the log of wages and the log of
earnings, respectively, that are estimated by the corresponding OLS residuals, lnw
+
it is
12We consider as regressors in the earnings equation for each year the same variables that we included
in the wage equation, and two additional variables, the number of children less that 6 year old and
the number of children between 6 and 18. Estimation results from these regressions are available upon
request.
16the unobservable theoretical wage that is equal to ￿t + ￿t￿i + uit, and ￿it is equal to
￿u￿
it + "it and assumed to be white noise. The parameters of interest to be estimated are
￿t, the variance of the permanent component of wage (￿2
￿), the time-varying variance of
the transitory shock (￿2
￿t), the variance of ￿it (￿2
￿), the variance of the measurement error
in wages (￿2
￿), the covariance between the permanent components of wages and earnings
(￿￿;F), the individual￿labour supply elasticity (￿), the autoregresive coe¢ cient in the
wage transitory shocks (￿), and the covariance between the measurement error term in
wages ￿it and ￿it (￿￿;￿). Again, notice that for t = 1; ￿2
v1 can not be identi￿ed. Instead
of this parameter, we will estimate ￿2
u1 that is equal to ￿￿2
u0 + ￿2
v1: For identi￿cation
purposes, we normalize ￿2
F=1.13
From the system (16a) and (16b), we obtain the set of theoretical moment conditions




F + (1 + ￿)2V ar(lnw
+
it) + V ar(￿it) + 2￿(1 + ￿)￿t￿￿;F k = 0
￿2￿2




it+k) + ￿(1 + ￿)(￿t + ￿t+k)￿￿;F jkj > 0
8t(17)
where the theoretical moments predictions for the true unobserved wages, lnw
+
it, are
given by (9) excluding the measurement error component. In addition to this, we use the
cross-moment conditions of wages and earnings that are given by
Cov(￿it;&it+k) =
￿￿t￿￿;F + (1 + ￿)2V ar(lnw
+
it) + ￿￿;￿ k = 0




it+k) jkj > 0
8t (18)
Similarly to the wage equation, we estimate the present model by EWMD. Speci￿cally,
we ￿t the 55 second moment predictions implied by our econometric model (16a) and (16b)
to the empirical covariance structure of these variables for our sample of continuously
working males.
13Results from the estimation of parameters ￿2
F; ￿￿F , and ￿ based on simulations of the joint model
of wages and earnings show that these parameters are very imprecisely estimated. In particular, the
standard deviation of the estimate of ￿2
F for di⁄erent simulated samples turned out to be very large
unless sample sizes were considerably large. This points to an identi￿cation problem of the parameters
of the model. Therefore, we decided to set ￿2
F equal to 1.
17Table 7. Earnings Inequality Decomposition (1994-1998).(1)
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Overall Inequality 0.224 0.227 0.244 0.214 0.213
Between-Group Inequality 0.112 0.109 0.125 0.118 0.111
Percentage Explained (%) 50.074 48.240 51.224 55.324 51.962
Residual Inequality 0.112 0.117 0.119 0.095 0.102
Percentage Residual (%) 49.926 51.760 48.776 44.676 48.038
Sample Size 1456 1413 1338 1676 1665
Note:(1) Earnings inequality is measured by the sample variance of log earnings for each year.
Results are based on OLS regressions of the log of earnings on two dummies for the education
level (secondary and graduate studies, respectively), the age and age squared, a dummy for the
marital status, the speci￿c experience and the speci￿c experience squared, a set of dummies for
the size and the economic activity of the ￿rm, the region, and two fertility variables (children
less than 6, and children between 6 and 18).














￿ 0.051￿￿￿ ￿￿F -0.089￿￿￿
(0.007) (0.013)
￿2
u1 0.030￿￿￿ ￿ 0.459￿
(0.012) (0.288)
￿2
v2 0.019￿￿ ￿ 0.121￿￿￿
(0.009) (0.006)
￿2
v3 0.029￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ 0.024￿￿
(0.012) (0.011)
Goodness ￿ of ￿ fit 55.455 p ￿ value 0.042
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Degrees of freedom for goodness-of-￿t statistics,
39. Number of observations, 2814 men with a total of 7548 individual-year observations. (*)
Signi￿cant at 10%, (**) signi￿cant at 5%, (***) signi￿cant at 1%.
29Table 8 presents the estimation results for the joint model of unobserved wages and
earnings. Most of the parameter estimates for the wage equation are highly signi￿cant
and pretty similar to those in Table 5, except that the autocorrelation parameter in the
transitory component of wages is smaller in this case. With respect to the parameter
estimates from the earnings equation, we can see that the covariance between the per-
manent wage and earnings components (￿￿F) is negative and very signi￿cant. Given the
estimate for ￿2
￿ and the fact that we have normalized ￿2
F to 1, this implies a correlation
between both components equal to ￿0:394. Similarly, we can infer from the estimation
results that the correlation between the wage measurement error term ￿it and the term
￿it in the earnings equation is substantially high (0:781).14 Finally, with respect to the
labour supply behaviour, we can see that our parameter ￿ is signi￿cantly positive but
small (0:121). This result is in line with the evidence shown by MaCurdy (1981) and
Altonji (1986) that arrive at estimates of this intertemporal substitution elasticity in the
neighborhood of 0:10 and 0:40 using data drawn from PSID.15 Therefore, this result that
the hypothesis of "no labour supply" is clearly rejected by our data.
The GMM goodness-of-￿t statistic (55.455, with 39 degrees of freedom) re￿ ects that
this wage and labour supply model does not provide a very good statistical ￿t to the data.
However, as Hyslop (2001) notes this ￿t is comparable to other models ￿t to covariance
structures in the literature (Dickens (2000), Hyslop (2001), Blundell et al. (2003)) and
could be due to the fact that the labour supply model is extremely parsimonious.
5 Earnings Inequality Predictions
In this section, we use the estimation results obtained for the joint model of individu-
als￿unobserved wages and earnings to compute the predicted cross-sectional variance of
the log of earnings residuals along our sample period. The comparison of these predic-
tions with the sample cross-sectional variance gives us information about the ability of
14Remember that the term ￿it is equal to ￿u￿
it + "it; where "it represents the measurement errors in
earnings: Therefore, given that wages are computed by the ratio between annual earnings and annual
hours of work, we should expect a positive correlation between ￿it and ￿it:
15In addition to this evidence, there are other papers in the literature that have obtained very imprecise
estimates of the intertemporal labour supply elasticity (i.e. Abowd and Card (1989) for male labour
supply and Arellano et al.(1999) for female labour supply).
18our model to reproduce the empirical evidence shown by our sample. Furthermore, we
quantify the relative contributions of permanent components, transitory components and
the individuals￿labour supply decisions on the levels and changes in residual earnings
inequality.
Table 9 reports the results of this quantitative analysis. Speci￿cally, the ￿rst two
rows report the level and the change in the sample variance and the predicted variance
of the log of earnings residuals between 1994 and 1998, respectively. We can observe that
these two elements turn out to be pretty similar for all years. This shows that the model
for wages and earnings given by (16a) and (16b) provides a reasonable approximation
to the empirical evidence in our sample. In particular, we can see that the data and
the predictions obtained from the model show a reduction of 8.5-10.5 percent in the
residual earnings inequality for the overall period eventhough there are some year-to-year
￿ uctuations. In addition to this, this decrease is smaller than the reduction experienced
by the residual wage inequality shown in Table 6. Rows 3-6 present the decomposition
of the predicted residual earnings inequality into components attributable to permanent
factors and transitory factors. In particular, results in rows 3 and 5 show that permanent
inequality and transitory inequality16 decrease over the period. Moreover, this reduction
is substantially larger for the part of the cross-sectional variance that is explained by
transitory factors. With respect to the relative contribution of these two types of factors,
we should notice from rows 4 and 6 that both of them play a very similar role in the
levels of earnings inequality (around 50 percent on average). However, permanent factors
have increased slightly their relative contribution over the period by almost 6 percent.
This change in the factor composition of earnings inequality together with the signi￿cant
decrease in the transitory inequality is in line with the evidence shown by Cervini and
Ramos (2006) for a sample of male full-time employees from the ECHP. In particular,
they ￿nd that in 1994 the transitory component played a somewhat larger role but, over
the next years, earnings dispersion became more persistent and less transitory. As they
argue, this could show the e⁄ectiveness of the labour market reforms undertaken in 1994
16Permanent inequality is determined by the terms involving wage permanent components and Fi:
Transitory inequality is determined by the wage transitory components and ￿it: As we mentioned above,
￿it is equal to ￿u￿
it + "it and u￿
it and "it can not be separately identi￿ed. Therefore, we consider the
measurement error term "it as part of the transitory components.
19and 1997 in Spain which aimed for a reduction of temporary employment. In fact, if we
decompose the residual earnings inequality change over the period into permanent factors
and transitory factors, our results suggest that a quarter of this variation is explained by
the reduction in the permanent inequality and three quarters is due to transitory factors.17
Finally, we now refer to the relative contribution of individuals￿labour supply re-
sponses to the cross-sectional residual earnings inequality. This analysis requires the
computation of a counterfactual for the residual earnings inequality under the assump-
tion of non-existence of a signi￿cant labour supply behaviour. In particular, we compute
the predicted residual earnings inequality assuming that the intertemporal substitution
elasticity ￿ is zero. If we apply this condition to equation (16b), we obtain the following
&it = lnH + lnw
+
it + "it (19)
Notice from this equation that we need to estimate ￿2
" to compute the predicted
variance of earnings residuals under the counterfactual. However, as we mentioned above,
￿2
" and ￿2
u￿ can not be identi￿ed separately. Therefore, the exact value for the predicted
earnings inequality given by (19) can not be computed from our estimates and only
bounds can be provided. Speci￿cally, the lower bound is given by the predictions obtained
assuming that there is not measurement error in earnings. Then, in this case, ￿it is equal
to ￿u￿
it and the lower bound is given by the predicted cross-sectional variance of lnw
+
it:
The upper bound is contructed assuming that ￿it is given exclusively by the measurement
error in earnings. Therefore, ￿it is equal to "it and the upper bound it is determined by
the predicted cross-sectional variance of lnw
+
it +￿it. Rows 7 and 8 in Table 9 present the
results for these upper and lower bounds of the predicted residual earnings inequality in
the absence of a signi￿cant labour supply behaviour, respectively. In addition to this, rows
9 and 10 show the lower and upper bound for the contribution of individuals￿labour supply
behaviour to residual earnings inequality, respectively.18 In particular, we can see that
17In particular, results in Table 9 show that the predicted residual earnings inequality has decreased over
the period by 10.5 percent. If we decompose this reduction into permanent and transitory components, we
obtain that the decrease due to permanent factors and transitory factors is 2.5794 and 7.9137, respectively.
Therefore, our model predicts that a quarter of the reduction in residual earnings inequality (10.5 percent)
is explained by the reduction in the permanent inequality and three quarters is due to transitory factors.
18The relative contribution of individuals￿labour supply has been computed as the relative weight
on the predicted residual earnings inequality of the di⁄erence between the residual earnings inequality
20Table 9. Earnings Inequality Predictions
EWMD Estimation.
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Average 94-98 change (%)
Sample Variance 0.1116 0.1174 0.1192 0.0954 0.1022 0.1091 -8.4416
Predicted Variance 0.1137 0.1138 0.1187 0.0978 0.1018 0.1091 -10.4931
Predicted Permanent Variance 0.0548 0.0610 0.0547 0.0505 0.0519 0.0546 -5.3517
Explained by Permanent Factors (%)(1) 48.1973 53.6343 46.0972 51.6534 50.9658 50.1096 5.7441
Predicted Transitory Variance 0.0589 0.0527 0.0640 0.0473 0.0499 0.0545 -15.2766
Explained by Transitory Factors (%)(1) 51.8027 46.3657 53.9028 48.3466 49.0342 49.8904 -5.3443
Predicted Variance under ￿ = 0(2) 0.1027 0.1034 0.1062 0.0888 0.0922 0.0986 -9.8208
Predicted Variance under ￿ = 0(3) 0.0813 0.0825 0.0853 0.0679 0.0713 0.0777 -12.3481
Labour Supply (%)(2) 10.0554 9.0957 10.5040 9.1967 9.3798 9.6463 -6.7188
Labour Supply (%)(3) 28.4649 27.4904 28.1366 30.6016 29.9475 28.9282 5.2084
Note: (1) Predicted relative weight of each component on the predicted residual earnings
inequality. (2) Predicted cross-sectional variance of earnings and contribution of labour supply
behaviour to the variance of earnings assuming that ￿it is equal to "it. (3) Predicted cross-
sectional variance of earnings and contribution of labour supply behaviour to the variance of
earnings assuming that ￿it is equal to ￿u￿
it.
Table 10. Predicted Cross-Sectional Variances, 1994-1998.






Note: (1) Lower and upper bounds.
30the relative contribution of the individuals￿labour supply range on average for the overall
period between 9 and 28 percent. This means that in the absence of a signi￿cant labour
supply behaviour, residual earnings inequality would have been lower in 9-28 percent.
Therefore, this evidence suggests that intertemporal substitution e⁄ects in which each
individual￿ s hours of work react positively to variations in the own wage reinforce the
transmission of wage inequality to earnings inequality. Related to this, we compare in
Table 10 the predicted cross-sectional variance of the unobservable theoretical wages and
the cross-sectional variance of the unobservable theoretical earnings. From the predictions
of equation (4) and the existence of a signi￿cant and positive labour supply behaviour, we
expect that the cross-sectional variance of the unobservable theoretical wages is smaller
than the cross-sectional variance of the unobservable theoretical earnings. To con￿rm
this, we should compute the predicted cross-sectional variance of lnw
+
it = ￿t + ￿t￿i + uit






as we explained above, ￿it = ￿u￿
it + "it and u￿
it can not be separately identi￿ed from "it
in our model. Therefore, we compute a lower and upper bound for this cross-sectional
variance. The lower bound has been computed assuming that ￿it is given exclusively by
the measurement error in earnings. Therefore, ￿it is equal to "it and the lower bound for
the cross-sectional variance of the unobservable theoretical earnings is determined by the
cross-sectional variance of ￿Fi + (￿ + 1)lnw
+
it: On the other hand, the upper bound has
been computed assuming that ￿it is given exclusively by ￿u￿
it. Therefore, the upper bound
is determined by the cross-sectional variance of ￿Fi+(￿+1)lnw
+
it +￿u￿
it: Results in Table
10 show that the cross-sectional variance of the unobserved theoretical wages is always
smaller than the cross-sectional variance of the unobserved theoretical earnings. This
con￿rms again that positive responses to wage rates changes enlarge earnings inequality
with respect to wage inequality. This di⁄ers from the results in terms of the observable
variables shown in Table 3 and section 3.1 where we saw that the cross-sectional variance
of the log of earnings was smaller than the cross-sectional variance of the log of wages.
Notice that this result could be driven by the importance of the variance of wages explained
by our observables and the large relative contribution of the measurement error in wages
(around 37 percent on average for the overall period).
Finally, we should remark that the previous results on earnings inequality predictions
predicted by the model and the residual earnings inequality predicted assuming ￿ = 0:
21have been computed under the assumption that ￿2
F is equal to one. As a robustness
check of our results to this normalization, we estimate the joint model of wages and
earnings assuming two extreme values for this parameter. Table 11 and Table 12 in
the Appendix show the predictions and the decomposition of residual earnings inequality
obtained when ￿2
F is set to 0.01 and 5000, respectively. From these results, we conclude
that this normalization assumption is not an important concern since predictions are very
similar under these two alternative values.19
6 Conclusion
In this paper we document the evolution of wage and earnings inequality for a sample of
Spanish continuously working males from the ECHP for the period from 1994 to 1998.
In particular, we analyse the link between the dispersion in the wage rates and individ-
ual earnings inequality taking into account two labour market features that could a⁄ect
this transmission. First, the distinction between permanent components and transitory
components and their relative contribution to wage and earnings inequality. Second, the
existence of signi￿cant responses in individuals￿hours of work to shifts in their own wage
rates. For this analysis we use an error component model for wages and earnings that is
based on an intertemporal individual labour supply model ￿ la MaCurdy (1981). This
model is estimated by EWMD.
The evidence presented in this paper shows that cross-sectional inequality in wages
and individual earnings have decreased during the sample period by almost 3 percent and
5 percent, respectively. When we decompose inequality in "between-group inequality" and
"residual inequality", we obtain that our observables explain on average around 50 percent
of the cross-sectional variance in wages and in individual earnings. Given the magnitude
of the cross-sectional dispersion that can not be explained by our observable character-
istics of individuals and their jobs, we focus on the variance-decomposition analysis of
the residual inequality of wages and earnings. Our results suggest that both wage and
19The estimation of the model assuming di⁄erent values for ￿2
F shows that d ￿￿F gets larger in absolute
value and b ￿ gets smaller as ￿2
F increases. However, this does not a⁄ect the results for the predictions
and the decomposition of inequality. Results for the parameter estimates of the model are available upon
request.
22earnings residual inequality have decreased in the overall period although the reduction
for earnings has been smaller. Besides, the decomposition of the earnings inequality shows
that both permanent variance and transitory variance have decreased between 1994 and
1998 but permanent factors have increased their relative contribution in explaining earn-
ings inequality. This re￿ ects that earnings dispersion have become more persistent and
less transitory. Moreover, around three quarters of the reduction in earnings inequality is
attributed to transitory factors. With respect to individual labour supply behaviour, we
￿nd a signi￿cant and positive intertemporal substitution elasticity of 0.121. This implies
that residual earnings inequality would have been lower in 9-28 percent in the absence of
a signi￿cant labour supply behaviour for males in our sample. Given that the predicted
earnings variance has decreased around 10.5 percent in the overall period, this result
con￿rms that male labour supply behaviour plays a substantial role in the evolution of
earnings inequality.
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25APPENDIX
Table 11 Earnings Inequality Predictions (￿2
F = 0:01)
EWMD Estimation.
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Average 94-98 change (%)
Sample Variance 0.1116 0.1174 0.1192 0.0954 0.1022 0.1091 -8.4416
Predicted Variance 0.1134 0.1140 0.1181 0.0983 0.1019 0.1091 -10.0778
Predicted Permanent Variance 0.0523 0.0589 0.0521 0.0471 0.0488 0.0518 -6.8121
Explained by Permanent Factors (%)(1) 46.1763 51.6456 44.1686 47.8556 47.8533 47.5399 3.6317
Predicted Transitory Variance 0.0610 0.0551 0.0659 0.0513 0.0532 0.0573 -12.8796
Explained by Transitory Factors (%)(1) 53.8237 48.3544 55.8314 52.1444 52.1467 52.4601 -3.1157
Predicted Variance under ￿ = 0(2) 0.1056 0.1061 0.1099 0.0917 0.0951 0.1017 -9.9900
Predicted Variance under ￿ = 0(3) 0.0795 0.0799 0.0838 0.0656 0.0689 0.0755 -13.2809
Labour Supply (%)(2) 6.8320 6.9125 6.8439 6.6984 6.7410 6.8056 -1.3315
Labour Supply (%)(3) 29.9179 29.8740 29.0131 33.3156 32.4142 30.9069 8.3439
Note: (1) Predicted relative weight of each component on the predicted residual earnings
inequality. (2) Predicted cross-sectional variance of earnings and contribution of labour supply
behaviour to the variance of earnings assuming that ￿it is equal to "it. (3) Predicted cross-
sectional variance of earnings and contribution of labour supply behaviour to the variance of
earnings assuming that ￿it is equal to ￿u￿
it.
Table 12. Earnings Inequality Predictions (￿2
F = 5000)
EWMD Estimation.
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Average 94-98 change (%)
Sample Variance 0.1116 0.1174 0.1192 0.0954 0.1022 0.1091 -8.4416
Predicted Variance 0.1133 0.1135 0.1177 0.0989 0.1023 0.1091 -9.6778
Predicted Permanent Variance 0.0557 0.0617 0.0555 0.0512 0.0526 0.0553 -5.6224
Explained by Permanent Factors (%)(1) 49.1764 54.3857 47.1514 51.7545 51.3844 50.7705 4.4899
Predicted Transitory Variance 0.0576 0.0518 0.0622 0.0477 0.0497 0.0538 -13.6018
Explained by Transitory Factors (%)(1) 50.8236 45.6143 52.8486 48.2455 48.6156 49.2295 -4.3444
Predicted Variance under ￿ = 0(2) 0.1076 0.108299 0.1120 0.0929 0.0964 0.1034 -10.4008
Predicted Variance under ￿ = 0(3) 0.0840 0.0847 0.0884 0.0693 0.0728 0.0799 -13.3166
Labour Supply (%)(2) 5.0182 4.5868 4.8564 6.0894 5.7786 5.2659 15.1508
Labour Supply (%)(3) 25.8152 25.3452 24.8720 29.9124 28.8038 26.9497 11.5771
Note: (1) Predicted relative weight of each component on the predicted residual earnings
inequality. (2) Predicted cross-sectional variance of earnings and contribution of labour supply
behaviour to the variance of earnings assuming that ￿it is equal to "it. (3) Predicted cross-
sectional variance of earnings and contribution of labour supply behaviour to the variance of
earnings assuming that ￿it is equal to ￿u￿
it.
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